Popular matchings have recently been a subject of study in the context of the so-called House Allocation Problem, where the objective is to match applicants to houses over which the applicants have preferences. A matching M is called popular if there is no other matching M ′ with the property that more applicants prefer their allocation in M ′ to their allocation in M . In this paper we study popular matchings in the context of the Roommates Problem, including its special (bipartite) case, the Marriage Problem. We investigate the relationship between popularity and stability, and describe efficient algorithms to test a matching for popularity in these settings. We also show that, when ties are permitted in the preferences, it is NP-hard to determine whether a popular matching exists in both the Roommates and Marriage cases.
Introduction

Background
Stable matching problems have a long history, dating back to the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [10] , and these problems continue as an area of active research among computer scientists, mathematicians and economists [14, 27] . An instance of the classical Stable Marriage problem (sm) involves sets of n men and n women, and each person has a strict order of preference (their preference list) over all of the members of the opposite sex. A stable matching M is a set of n disjoint man-woman pairs such that no man m and woman w who do not form a pair prefer each other to their partners in M . The Stable Roommates problem (sr) is the generalisation of sm to the non-bipartite case, where each person has a strict order of preference over all of the others.
Gale and Shapley [10] showed that every instance of sm admits a stable matching, and such a matching can be found in O(n 2 ) time, whereas, by contrast, some sr instances admit no stable matching. Irving [16] gave an O(n 2 ) time algorithm to find a stable matching in an sr instance, when one exists.
A wide range of extensions of these fundamental problems have been studied. For instance, the existence results and efficient algorithms extend to the case where preference lists are incomplete, i.e., when participants can declare some of the others to be unacceptable as partners. In this case, both the Gale-Shapley algorithm and Irving's algorithm can
The contribution of this paper
Our prime focus in this paper is the problem of finding popular matchings in the Roommates and Marriage contexts. In Section 2 we formalise the problem descriptions and give the necessary terminology and notation. In Section 3 we focus on strict preferences. We describe some basic properties of popular matchings, and the more restrictive strongly popular matchings, and their relation to stable matchings. We give a linear time algorithm to test for and to find a strongly popular matching for Roommates instances without ties. We show that, given a Roommates instance (with or without ties) and a matching M , we can test whether M is popular in O( nα(n, m)m log 3/2 n) time (where α is the inverse Ackermann's function), and in the Marriage case we show how this can be improved to O( √ nm) time. This latter result generalises a previous O( √ nm) algorithm for the special case where preference lists may include ties and are symmetric (i.e., a man m ranks a woman w in kth place if and only if w ranks m in kth place) [28] . In Section 4 we first investigate which of the results of Section 3 can be extended to the case of ties. Then we establish an NP-completeness result for the problem of determining whether a popular matching exists for a Marriage (or Roommates) instance with ties. We conclude with some open problems in Section 5.
Related work
Gärdenfors [12] introduced the notions of a (strong) majority 1assignment, which is equivalent to a (strongly) popular matching in our terminology. He proved that every stable matching is popular in the Marriage case with strict preferences. Also, he showed that a strongly popular matching is stable in the Marriage case, even if there are ties in the preference lists.
The results of Abraham et al. [1] mentioned above led to a number of subsequent papers exploring further aspects and extensions of popular matchings in ha. Manlove and Sng [21] studied the extension in which each house has a capacity, the maximum number of applicants that can be assigned to it in any matching, and gave a O( √ Cn 1 + m) time algorithm for this variant, where C is the sum of the capacities of the houses and n 1 is the number of applicants. Mestre [24] gave a linear time algorithm for a version of the problem in which each applicant has an associated weight. This algorithm, which assumes that all houses have capacity 1, was extended by Sng and Manlove [29] to the case where houses can have non-unitary capacities. Mahdian [19] showed that, for random instances of ha, popular matchings exist with high probability if the number of houses exceeds the number of applicants by a small constant multiplicative factor. Abraham and Kavitha [2] studied a dynamic version of ha allowing for applicants and houses to enter and leave the market, and for applicants to arbitrarily change their preference lists. They showed the existence of a 2-step voting path to compute a new popular matching after every such change, assuming that a popular matching exists. McCutchen [22] focused on instances of ha for which no popular matching exists, defining two notions of 'near popularity', and proving that, for each of these, finding a matching that is as near to popular as possible is NP-hard. Huang et al. [15] built upon the work of McCutchen with a study of approximation algorithms in the context of near popularity. Kavitha and Nasre [18] described algorithms to determine an optimal popular matching for various interpretations of optimality. McDermid and Irving [23] characterised the structure of the set of popular matchings for an ha instance, and gave efficient algorithms to count and enumerate the popular matchings, and to find several kinds of optimal popular matchings (in the latter case improving on the time complexities of [18] ).
In voting theory, a well-established concept of majority equilibrium is the following. Let S = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a society of n individuals, and let X be a set of alternatives. Each individual i ∈ S has a preference order, ≥ i , on X. An alternative x ∈ X is called a weak Condorcet winner if for every y ∈ X distinct of x, |{i ∈ S : x > i y}| ≥ |{i ∈ S : y > i x}|; x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every y ∈ X distinct of x, |{i ∈ S : x > i y}| > |{i ∈ S : y > i x}|. It is easy to see that if the set of alternatives is the set of all possible matchings of the individuals then a matching is a weak (respectively strong) Condorcet winner if and only if it is popular (respectively strongly popular). Therefore the recent papers of Chen et al. [4, 5, 3] , which are concerned with the problems of finding a weak and strong Concordet winner for special graph models, are related to our work.
Problem descriptions, terminology and notation
Since the Roommates problem can be seen as an extension of the Marriage problem, we introduce our notation and terminology in the former setting. An instance I of the Roommates Problem (rp) comprises a set of agents A = {a 1 , . . . , a n }. For each agent a i there is a subset A i of A\{a i } containing a i 's acceptable partners, and a i has a linear order over A i , which we refer to as a i 's preference list. If a j precedes a k in a i 's preference list, we say that a i prefers a j to a k . We are also interested in the extension of rp, called the Roommates Problem with Ties (rpt), in which preference lists may contain tied entries, so that a i prefers a j to a k if and only if a j is a strict predecessor of a k in a i 's preference list. We say that agent a i is indifferent between a j and a k if a j and a k are tied in his preference list.
An instance I of rp may also be viewed as a graph G = (A, E) where {a i , a j } forms an edge in E if and only if a i and a j are each acceptable to the other. We assume that G contains no isolated vertices, and we let m = |E|. We refer to G as the underlying graph of I. A matching in I is a set of disjoint edges in the underlying graph G.
An instance of the Marriage Problem with Ties (mpt) may be viewed as an instance of rpt in which the underlying graph G is bipartite. The Marriage Problem (mp) is the analogous restriction of rp. In either case, the two sets of the bipartition are known as the men and the women.
Let I be an instance of rpt. Let M denote the set of matchings in I, and let M ∈ M. Given any a i ∈ A, if {a i , a j } ∈ M for some a j ∈ A, we say that a i is matched in M and M (a i ) denotes a j , otherwise a i is unmatched in M .
We define the preferences of an agent over matchings as follows. Given two matchings M and M ′ in M, we say that an agent a i prefers M ′ to M if either (i) a i is matched in M ′ and unmatched in M , or (ii) a i is matched in both M ′ and M and prefers 
A blocking pair with respect to a matching M ∈ M is an edge {a i , a j } ∈ E\M such that each of a i and a j prefers {{a i , a j }} to M . A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair. As observed earlier, an instance of rp or rpt may or may not admit a stable matching, whereas every instance of mp or mpt admits at least one such matching.
Given two matchings M and
Furthermore, for a set of agents
We will also use the standard notation M | S for the restriction of a matching M to the set of agents S, where v ∈ S is considered to be unmatched in M | S if he is matched in M but M (v) is not in S.
The case of strict preferences
In this section we investigate popular matchings in instances of rp and mp where, by definition, every agent's preference list is strictly ordered.
Relationships between strongly popular, popular and stable matchings
We will prove some useful lemmas by using the above identity for two particular partitions.
First, let us consider the component-wise partition of V (G) for the symmetric difference of two matchings M and
We consider the following equation:
Note that if |C i | = 1 then it must be the case that D C i (M, M ′ ) = 0 since the corresponding agent is either unmatched in both M and M ′ or has the same partner in M and M ′ .
Lemma 1. For a given instance of rp, a matching M is popular if and only if, for any other matching
Proof. The popularity of M is straightforward from Equation 1, since
On the other hand, suppose that M is popular but
A similar statement holds for strongly popular matchings, as we now show.
Lemma 2. For a given instance of rp, a matching M is strongly popular if and only if, for any other matching
Proof. The strong popularity of M is a consequence of Equation 1, i.e.,
On the other hand, suppose that M is strongly popular but
Now, let M , M ′ be any two matchings and let F = M ′ \ M = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e k }. Further let X ⊆ V (G) be the set of agents covered by F and letX = V (G) \ X. Considering the partition {E 1 , E 2 , . . . E k ,X}, where E i represents the end vertices of the edge e i , we have
We use the above equation to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that we are given an instance of rp and two matchings M and M ′ . We note that the result of Lemma 3(b) was proved by Gärdenfors [12] for mp.
We continue by giving a straightforward connection between strongly popular and popular matchings in rp.
Proposition 4. Let I be an instance of rp and let M be a strongly popular matching in I. Then M is the only popular matching in I.
Corollary 5. An instance of rp admits at most one strongly popular matching.
The following proposition was proved by Gärdenfors [12] for mp. Here we generalise the result to the rp context. Proposition 6. Let I be an instance of rp and let M be a strongly popular matching in I. Then M is stable in I.
Proof. If M is not stable then let {a i , a j } be a blocking pair of M . Let M ′ be a matching formed from M as follows: (i) remove the edge
Lemma 3(b) and Proposition 6 thus give the following chain of implications involving properties of a matching M in an instance I of rp:
The following well-known instance of rp introduced by Gale and Shapley [10] , illustrates that a popular matching may exist even if the instance does not admit a stable matching. Moreover, a sub-instance of that (as indicated in Example 1) illustrates that a popular matching may not exist. This instance of rp has no stable matching, but it admits two popular matchings, namely M 1 = {{a 1 , a 4 }, {a 2 , a 3 }} and M 2 = {{a 2 , a 4 }, {a 1 , a 3 }}. However, we note that after removing a 4 the resulting instance does not admit any popular matching.
Every instance of mp admits a stable matching, and hence a popular matching as well. However, Example 2, an mp instance, illustrates that a unique stable matching (which is also a unique popular matching) is not necessarily strongly popular. Therefore Examples 1 and 2 show that the converse to each of the above implications is not true in general.
Example 2. There are five agents with preference lists as shown.
There are four maximal matchings in this instance of mp, namely:
The following table shows the value of |P (M r , M s )| for each (r, s) (1 ≤ r, s ≤ 4):
M 1 is the unique stable matching. The table entries also indicate that M 1 is the unique popular matching, though M 1 is not strongly popular.
Furthermore, Examples 3, 4 and 5, presented below, illustrate some interesting properties of mp instances, namely, that a popular matching can be larger than a stable matching, a maximum cardinality matching need not be popular, and the relation ≻ can cycle (even if a stable matching exists).
Example 3. The preference lists for an instance of mp are as shown.
The matching M 1 = {{m 1 , w 2 }} is stable (in fact M is the unique stable matching) and thus popular for this instance. However the matching M 2 = {{m 1 , w 1 }, {m 2 , w 2 }} is popular but not stable. This example also illustrates that a popular matching can be larger than a stable matching, which motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality popular matching, given an instance of mp. The unique perfect matching M 1 = {{m 1 , w 1 }, {m 2 , w 2 }, {m 3 , w 3 }} is not popular (M 2 = {{m 2 , w 1 }, {m 3 , w 2 })} is more popular than M 1 ).
Example 5. The following instance of mp was presented in the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [10] . The preference lists are as shown. Matching M 0 = {{m 1 , w 1 }, {m 2 , w 3 }, {m 3 , w 2 }} is stable and hence popular for this instance. However consider the following matchings:
It is easy to verify that
Testing for and finding a strongly popular matching
We begin this section by giving an O(m) algorithm that tests a given stable matching for strong popularity. Let I be an instance of rp and let M be a stable matching in I. Define the graph H M = (A, E M ), where
Lemma 7. Let I be an instance of rp and let M be a stable matching in I. Let H M be the graph defined above. Then M is strongly popular in I if and only if H M contains no alternating cycle or augmenting path relative to M .
Proof. Strong popularity implies that no such alternating cycle or augmenting path exists in H M relative to M by Lemma 2. This is because if M ′ is the matching obtained by switching edges along this alternating path (or cycle) and C i denotes the set of agents involved then it would be the case that D C i (M, M ′ ) ≤ 0 in this component. On the other hand, suppose that M is stable but not strongly popular, i.e., there is a matching M ′ such that D(M ′ , M ) = 0. The statements of Lemma 3(c) hold in this case too by the very same argument used in the proof of that result (only with the difference that whilst M was stable and M ′ was popular in Lemma 3, here M is stable and M ′ is as popular as M , but not necessarily popular). The fact that M ′ covers all the vertices that are covered by M means that each component of M ′ ⊕ M is either an alternating cycle or an augmenting path. And since
Based on Lemma 7 we can give a linear time algorithm for the problem of finding a strongly popular matching as indicated by the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Given an instance I of rp, we may find a strongly popular matching or report that none exists in O(m) time.
Proof. We firstly test whether I admits a stable matching in O(m) time [14, Section 4.5.2]. If no such matching exists, I does not admit a strongly popular matching by Proposition 6. Now suppose that I admits a stable matching M . Then I admits a strongly popular matching if and only if M is strongly popular. For, suppose that I admits a strongly popular matching M ′ = M . Then M ′ is certainly popular, and M is popular by Lemma 3(b), a contradiction to to Proposition 4. By Lemma 7, M is strongly popular if and only if H M contains no augmenting path or alternating cycle relative to M . Clearly H M has O(n) vertices and O(m) edges. We may test for the existence of each of these structures in O(m) time (see [6, 8] and [7] respectively).
Testing for popularity
In order to test a matching M in a given instance of rp for popularity, we form a weighted graph H M as follows. The vertices of H M are A∪A ′ , where
For each edge {a i , a j } ∈ E, we define δ i,j as follows:
For each edge {a i , a j } ∈ E, we define the weight of {a i , a j } in H M to be δ i,j +δ j,i . Similarly, for each edge {a ′ i , a ′ j } ∈ E ′ , we define the weight of {a ′ i , a ′ j } in H M to be δ i,j + δ j,i . Finally, for each edge {a i , a ′ i } ∈ E ′′ , we define the weight of {a i , a ′ i } in H M to be -1 if a i is matched in M , and 0 otherwise. It is clear that the weight of each edge belongs to the set {−1, 0, 1}.
In what follows, given a matching M in G, we define M ′ to be a matching in
Lemma 9. Let I be an instance of rp and let M be a matching in I. Let H M be the weighted graph defined above. Then M is popular if and only if a maximum weight perfect matching in H M has weight 0.
Proof. Let M 1 be any matching in I, and let A M 1 denote the agents in A who are matched in M 1 . Define the matching
We claim that wt(S(M 1 )) = D(M 1 , M ), where wt(M ∼ ) is the weight of a matching
Define n − , n 0 , n + to be the numbers of edges of weight −1, 0, 1 in X respectively. Also define n ′′ − to be the number of edges of weight 
Hence by the above claim, it follows that either M 1 or M 2 respectively is more popular than M , a contradiction.
Theorem 10. Given an instance I of rp and a matching M in I, we can test whether M is popular in O( nα(n, m)m log 3/2 n) time.
Proof. Clearly H M has O(n) vertices and O(m) edges. The current fastest algorithm for finding a maximum weight perfect matching in a weighted graph with weights {−1, 0, 1} has complexity O( nα(n, m)m log 3/2 n) [9] .
It is clear that a perfect matching M * of positive weight exists in H M if and only if H M admits an alternating cycle (relative to S(M )) of positive weight. It is an open question whether testing for such an alternating cycle is possible in a better running time than finding a maximum weight perfect matching in the general case.
However, this is possible in the mp case. First we observe that if G is bipartite then H M is also bipartite. Then the problem of finding an alternating cycle of positive weight can be reduced to the problem of finding a directed cycle of positive weight in D M , where D M is a directed graph obtained by orienting the edges of H M in the following way: all the edges of S(M ) are directed from the men to the women and all the other edges are directed from the women to the men. The problem of finding a directed cycle of positive weight in a directed graph with weights {−1, 0, 1} (or reporting that none exists) can be solved in O( √ nm) time by the algorithm of Goldberg [13] . This implies the following result.
Theorem 11. Given an instance I of mp and a matching M in I, we can test whether M is popular in O( √ nm) time.
The case of preferences with ties
In this section we consider popular matchings in instances of rpt and mpt.
Some results extended to the case of ties
It is not hard to see that Proposition 4, Corollary 5 and Proposition 6 continue to hold in the presence of ties. However, one of the key differences is that stability no longer necessarily implies popularity, so that, in particular, it is not necessarily the case that an instance of mpt admits a popular matching. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 6. Here we give an instance of mpt, involving three men and three women, that admits two popular matchings, but one of its reduced instances does not admit any popular matching. This instance will be used as a gadget in the proof of Theorem 13 below. The preference lists are as follows.
Here the two popular matchings are M p 1 = {{m 1 , w 3 }, {m 2 , w 1 }, {m 3 , w 2 }} and M p 2 = {{m 1 , w 3 }, {m 2 , w 2 }, {m 3 , w 1 }}. To show the popularity of M p 1 , it is enough to observe that only m 1 and m 3 could get a better partner, but if m 1 gets a better partner then w 3 must be worse off, and if m 3 gets a better partner (i.e., becomes matched to w 1 ) then m 2 must be worse off. The popularity of M p 2 can be proved in a similar way. Finally it is possible to verify that no other matching is popular in this instance.
However, if we remove w 3 then the reduced instance does not admit any popular matching. This is because, relative to any matching M of size 2, two men can always improve (the unmatched man gets w 2 , and M (w 2 ) gets w 1 ) whilst only one man is worse off (M (w 1 ) becomes unmatched).
The algorithm for testing the popularity of a matching in an instance of rp can be extended to the ties case in a natural way, namely by setting δ i,j to be 0 if {a i , a j } ∈ M or if a i is indifferent between a j and M (a i ). As a result we will have weights {−1, − 1 2 , 0, 1 2 , 1} in H M but the technique and the complexity of the popularity checking algorithm (in both the rpt and mpt cases) does not change. On the other hand, the algorithm for finding a strongly popular matching no longer works for the case of ties.
However we can still check the strong popularity of a matching, using a similar technique to that used for popularity checking, in the following way. A matching M is strongly popular if and only if every perfect matching in H M , excluding S(M ), has negative weight. That is, if every perfect matching M * = S(M ) in H M has weight at most − 1 2 . We can reduce this decision problem to another maximum weight perfect matching problem, where w ε (e) = w(e) − ε = −ε for every edge e ∈ S(M ) (and w ε (e) = w(e) for every edge e of H M not in S(M )) where ε < 1 2n . Here S(M ) is the only perfect matching of weight 0 for w if and only if the maximum weight of a perfect matching in H M is −εn for w ε .
To facilitate description of some of the subsequent results in this section, we introduce some shorthand notation for variants of the popular matching problem, as follows: pop-mpt/rpt: the problem of determining whether a popular matching exists, given an instance of mpt/rpt; perfect-pop-mpt/rpt: the problem of determining whether there exists a perfect popular matching, given an instance of mpt/rpt.
Perfect popular matchings in the Marriage Problem with Ties
We next show that the problem of deciding whether a perfect popular matching exists, given an instance of mpt, is NP-complete.
Theorem 12. perfect-pop-mpt is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from exact-mm, that is the problem of deciding, given a graph G and an integer K, whether G admits a maximal matching of size exactly K. exact-mm is NP-complete even for subdivision graphs of cubic graphs [25] . Suppose that we are given an instance I of exact-mm with the above restriction on a graph G = (A ∪ B, E), where A = {u 1 , . . . , u n 1 } and B = {v 1 , . . . , v n 2 } satisfying 3n 1 = 3|A| = 2|B| = 2n 2 . We construct an instance I ′ of perfect-pop-mpt with a graph G ′ = (U ∪ V, E ′ ), where U and V are referred to as women and men respectively, as follows. Initially we let U = A and V = B.
The proper part of I ′ is the exact copy of I such that all neighbours of each agent u i ∈ A (and v j ∈ B) are in a tie in u i 's (and v j 's) preference list. The agents of the proper part are called proper agents. For each edge {u i , v j } ∈ E(G), we create two vertices, s i,j ∈ V and t i,j ∈ U with three edges, {u i , s i,j }, {s i,j , t i,j }, {t i,j , v j } in E ′ , where u i (and v j ) prefers her (his) proper neighbours to s i,j (to t i,j ) respectively, s i,j prefers u i to t i,j , whilst t i,j is indifferent between s i,j and v j . Moreover, for a given u i ∈ A, all agents of the form s i,j such that {u i , v j } ∈ E are tied in u i 's list in I ′ , and similarly, for a given v j ∈ B, all agents of the form t i,j such that {u i , v j } ∈ E are tied in v j 's list in I ′ . We complete the construction by adding two sets of garbage collectors to V and U , namely X = {x 1 , . . . , x n 1 −K } of size n 1 − K and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y n 2 −K } of size n 2 − K, respectively, such that these sets of agents appear in a tie at the end of each proper agent's list. That is, each u i ∈ A has the members of X in a tie at the tail of her list and each v j ∈ B has the members of Y in a tie at the tail of his list. The members of the garbage collectors are indifferent between the proper agents.
Suppose first that we have a maximal matching M of size K in I. We shall prove that
is unmatched in M } is a perfect popular matching in I ′ . M ′ is perfect obviously. We only need to show that M ′ is popular. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a matching M * more popular than M ′ in I ′ . Moreover, let M * be such a matching where |M * ⊕ M ′ | is minimal.
First we show that it cannot be the case that {{u i , s i,j }, {t i,j , v j }} ⊆ M * for any edge {u i , v j } ∈ E(G). We show that if this would be the case then M * * = (M * \ {{u i , s i,j }, {t i,j , v j }}) ∪ {{u i , v j }, {s i,j , t i,j }} would also be more popular than M ′ . However regarding the symmetric difference of M * * and M ′ , we get either
which is a contradiction to our assumption on the size of
• if both u i and v j are matched in M , but not to each other then again we have
• if u i is matched and v j is unmatched in M then again it follows that
Note that both u i and v j cannot be unmatched since M is maximal. To show that M * cannot be more popular than M ′ , we identify, for each agent that may prefer M * to M ′ , a corresponding agent who prefers M ′ to M * . Since M ′ is perfect, no garbage collector can prefer M * to M ′ , and also no t i,j can prefer M * to M ′ for any {u i , v j } ∈ E(G), obviously. From the above argument it is clear that if an agent s i,j prefers M * to M ′ (which can only happen if {u i , s i,j } ∈ M * ) then t i,j must prefer M ′ to M * (since t i,j must be unmatched in M * , as we proved). Now we show that for any u i ∈ A that prefers M * to M ′ there exists either a garbage collector x j k ∈ X who becomes unmatched in M * or some u i k ∈ A who prefers M ′ to M * . Let us consider the alternating path (in M * ⊕ M ′ ) starting from u i who was unmatched in M and therefore matched to some x j 1 ∈ X in M ′ . If x j 1 is unmatched in M * then we are done, otherwise we continue with M * (x j 1 ) = u i 1 . If u i 1 is matched in M and therefore she is matched to a proper agent in M ′ then we stop since u i 1 must prefer M ′ to M * , otherwise we continue with x j 2 = M ′ (u i 1 ), and so on. Eventually this path will lead either to some x j k ∈ X who was matched in M ′ but unmatched in M * , or to some u i k ∈ A who was matched in M but matched to a garbage collector in M * (therefore she prefers M ′ to M * ). The uniqueness of the correspondence of u i k to u i follows by the construction of the alternating path.
Finally we show that for any v j ∈ V that prefers M * to M ′ there exists either a garbage collector y i k ∈ Y who becomes unmatched in M * or some v j k ∈ B who prefers M ′ to M * . This is straightforward since again we can consider the alternating path starting from v j , and continuing with M ′ (v j ) = y i 1 ∈ Y that will lead either to some y i k ∈ Y who was matched in M ′ but unmatched in M * , or to some v j k ∈ B who was matched in M (therefore he is matched to a proper agent in M ′ ) but matched to a garbage collector in Theorems 12 and 13 imply the NP-completeness of perfect-pop-rpt and pop-rpt.
Open problems
In this paper we proved that the problem of finding a perfect popular matching (or reporting that none exists) given an mpt instance is NP-hard, and that the problem remains NP-hard even if we merely seek a popular matching (of arbitrary size). However, the complexity of the problem of constructing a maximum cardinality popular matching in an mp instance remains open. The other main open problem is whether finding a popular matching (or reporting that none exists) is possible in polynomial time for an instance of rp. A third open problem is the complexity of finding a strongly popular matching (or reporting that none exists), for an instance of rpt. Finally we remark that the abovementioned NP-hardness results were established for mpt instances with incomplete lists, and it is open as to whether the same results hold for complete lists.
Our results and the main open problems are summarised in Table 1. 
